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El Derecho de Aviso: Due Process
and Bilingual Notice
To the many people in our society who are unable to read English,
legal notices sent in English do not inform them of the contents
of the notification.1 The notice has failed in its purpose. The notion
that this type of notice satisfies due process requirements is a fiction
which is permissible only if actual notice-notice in a language which
the recipient can understand-is not feasible. The societal interest
in uniformity of language may be substantial,2 but basic constitu-
tional rights cannot be abrogated merely to facilitate linguistic assim-
ilation. "[C]ertain fundamental rights" are guaranteed "to all, to
those who speak other languages as well as to those born with
English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous
if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this can-
not be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution-
a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means." 3
This Note will argue that, insofar as is administratively feasible,
notices subject to due process requirements4 must generally be writ-
ten in a language that the recipient can read. This requirement will
entail some increased costs. Mere increased cost, however, is not a
sufficient reason for failing to render actual notice; rather the costs
1. For a discussion of the present practice of administrative agencies sending notices
only in English and the difficulties that are created for the recipient who does not
read English, see, e.g., New Haven Register, April 18, 1973, at 6, col. I (in the context
of the welfare system); letter from Floyd L. Pierce, Regional Civil Rights Director,
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, to Mr. Paul M. Allen, Director of
Sonoma County Department of Social Service, at 2-4, summarizing field survey of
welfare practices regarding non-English speaking clients in Sonoma County, California,
to determine whether such practices violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), on file with the Yale Law Journal [hereinafter cited as
Sonoma County HEW Study]; letter from John G. Bynoe, Regional Civil Rights Director
for Region I, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, to Mr. Nicholas Norton,
Commissioner of Connecticut State Welfare Department, August 31, 1973, at 7-8, sum-
marizing extensive field survey of welfare practices regarding non-English speaking
applicants and recipients in Connecticut, prepared for Judge Robert C. Zampano, U.S.
District Court, District of Connecticut, on file with the Yale Law Journal [hereinafter
cited as Connecticut HEW study]; State of Connecticut Welfare Department, De-
partmental Bull. No. 2795, Delivery of Departmental Services to Non-English Speaking
Applicants and Recipients, September 5, 1973, at 1, on file with the Yale Law Journal
[hereinafter cited as Connecticut Welfare Bulletin]. See note 34 infra for the essential
lindings of these studies.
2. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Guerrero
v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 812, 512 P.2d 833, 835, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201, 203 (1973); Castro
v. California, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 242, 466 P.2d 244, 258, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 34 (1970).
3. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). See Farrington v. Tokushige, 11 F.2d
710, 714 (9th Cir. 1926), aff'd, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
4. See p. 388 & note 16 infra.
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and administrative burdens imposed must be weighed against the
importance of the individual's rights that are at stake. 5 When the
costs involved in translating notices or in providing tag lines in the
major languages are relatively minor and the individual rights in-
volved are quite substantial, due process requires bilingual or tag
line notice for the non-English reader.6
I. The Scope of the Problem
Census data show that there are 7.9 million persons over the age
of 10 who are unable to read or write English.7 While no similar
data are available for the population below age 10, testimony in
connection with congressional consideration of the Bilingual Edu-
cation Act 8 indicates that English illiteracy is widespread among
schoolchildren from non-English speaking families. 9 It is thus ap-
parent that the problem of English illiteracy, widespread among
children, will not vanish in the near future.
Language disabilities frequently disadvantage persons facing legal
difficulties. The Spanish speaking constituency of one neighborhood
office of the New Haven Legal Assistance Association, for example,
brought in more than twice as many legal problems as did the
numerically larger English speaking clientele. 10 A great many of these
5. See p. 389 infra.
6. The discussion is concerned with those who are unable to read English, but are
literate in another language. The case of the illiterate who is unable to read any
language presents insurmountable problems for written notice which may be said to
approximate impossibility. It is impossible to provide actual notice to an illiterate
short of oral notice and this is often impractical. Oral notice is an unacceptable solu-
tion in many cases because it is not provable in court. Because of the impossibility
of providing effective written notice to an illiterate, due process concepts of notice
permit the fiction that notice in English is actual notice, placing the burden on the
illiterate to have such notice read to him.
7. UNITED SrATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT, SERIES P-20,
No. 221, CHARACTERISTICS OF TilE POPULATION BY ETHNIC ORIGIN: NOvEMBER 1969, at
18 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CURRENT POPULATION REPORT].
8. 20 U.S.C. § 880b (1970).
9. Former Representative Jacob H. Gilbert of New York stated that 90,000 pupils
in the New Yoxk City schools, including 70,000 Puerto Ricans, had insufficient skills
in English to graduate from high school. 113 CONG. REC. 19932-33 (1967). In 1957, a
Texas Education Agency survey showed that 80 percent of the non-English speaking
students spent two years in the first grade, 113 CoNG. REc. 29175-76 (1967), suggesting
that many were illiterate in English before beginning school. Dr. Faye Bumpass, Pro-
fessor of Spanish and Director of Dual Language Workshops, Texas Technological
College, Lubbock, Texas, testified that there are at least 1,750,000 schoolchildren with
Spanish surnames in the five southwestern states (Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colo-
rado and California), many of whom have serious English linguistic handicaps. 113
CONG. REC. 13522 (1967). See NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, THE INVISIBLE MINORITY
. . . PERO NO VENCIBLES, at IV (1966). In spite of the fact that these schoolchildren
are required to attend schools with instruction in English, the problem of English
illiteracy has not been eliminated.
10. Spanish speaking people, who comprised approximately one-third of the popu-
lation in the geographical area of the Howard Avenue office of the New Haven Legal
Assistance Association, nevertheless accounted for over two-thirds of the office's cases.
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problems had their origin in the language barrier. Non-English speak-
ing clients, ordinarily unable to read notices in English, are often
unaware of the nature of their legal problems, many of which could
have been resolved by a simple but timely telephone conversation."
Persons able to read English could have settled the same problems
without legal assistance, but the fact that all communications were
in English put the Spanish speakers at a distinct disadvantage.' 2
II. Due Process Requirements
The fundamental requisites of due process are notice and hear-
ing.13 While the exact nature and extent of the due process safe-
guards required at a hearing may vary with the nature of the in-
terests involved,' 4 adequate and timely notice must precede all due
These clients came to Legal Assistance long after their rights were adversely affected,
a fact which may indicate that notice in English did not apprise them of the problem.
Cases on file at New Haven Legal Assistance Association, 413 Howard Avenue, New
Haven, Conn.
11. The following relatively typical cases that arose at New Haven Legal Assistance
serve to illustrate the point:
Ms. R's welfare benefits were terminated for alleged fraud (failure to disclose per-
tinent information to the welfare department). The communications sent to Ms. R
informing her of her obligation to furnish the information were written in English.
Ms. R reads Spanish only and never learned of the obligation. She was eventually
reinstated on the welfare rolls but, unable to meet her rent obligations during the
month in which she was denied welfare benefits, she was evicted from her apartment.
In midwinter, Ms. A's gas was shut off for nonpayment of her bill. She had been
paying her gas bills for two years but had fallen behind in her payments. The Legal
Assistance Office, however, discovered that the welfare department was supposed to
have been paying for her gas directly to the gas company. She had never realized this
because her caseworker was unable to communicate with her in Spanish and notifica-
tion that the welfare department was paying for her gas had been sent in English.
Lacking actual notice she had erroneously paid the utility company over ;200.
12. See notes 32 & 34 infra.
13. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
14. The requirements of a due process hearing are not inflexible, but depend on
the substance of the private interest affected and the nature of the government func-
tion. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). That a due process hearing
is not fixed in form does not affect the basic requirement that an individual be given
a meaningful opportunity, "within the limits of practicability," to be heard before
being deprived of a significant property interest. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
379 (1971), citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950). Regardless of the interest affected, due process requires at a minimum that
the hearing provide an effective opportunity to answer charges and confront and cross-
examine witnesses. See Goldberg v. Kelly, supra at 267. When factual issues may be in
dispute, these safeguards have been held to apply to administrative and regulatory
actions, see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (suspension of motor vehicle license
for failure to post security for accident damages); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra at 267-70;
Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 105 (1963) (exclusion front
practice of law); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492, 496-97 (1959) (denial of security
clearance); Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926) (denial of
application of CPA petitioning to practice before Board of Tax Appeals); Escalera v.
New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853
(1970); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); as well as
criminal cases, see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) (robbery conviction);
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (contempt citation).
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process hearings. 15 Not all hearings must be preceded by notice, of
course. The operation of the due process clause is limited to in-
stances of state action.'; Where state action is involved, however,
notice adequate to satisfy due process requirements is necessary.
Due process notice must be "reasonably calculated to give . . .
actual notice."' 7 Actual notice, in turn, is notice by which the per-
son "sought to be affected knows thereby of the existence of the par-
ticular fact in question."' 8 Due process requires that the notice
apprise the recipient not only of the pendency of the action,'0 but
also of the reasons for such action in order that he may contest its
basis and produce evidence in rebuttal. 20 Considerations of adminis-
15. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 266-67 (1970); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (failure to give
petitioner notice of adoption proceedings violates due process-notice of hearing niust
be delivered at meaningful place and in meaningful manner (dictum)); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
16. In general, state action can be said to include all court actions, initiated either
by the government or an individual or business, seeking a state forum to enforce a
contract, lease, or other obligation through court adjudication, see, e.g., Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969) (garnishment); activities of government administrative and regulatory agen-
cies, see, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 537 (1971) (suspension of motor vehicle
license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare agency termination of benefits);
actions involving public employment termination, see, e.g., Wilderman v. Nelson, 467
F.2d 1173, 1175 (8th Cir. 1972) (termination of state employees holding contractual
rights to continuing state employment under tenure plans as well as for employees
having a cognizable property interest in continued employment based on de facto
tenure program fostered by the state and relied on by the employees); Ballard v. Laird,
350 F. Supp. 167, 168 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (demotion or dismissal from armed services);
Nichols v. Eckert, 504 F.2d 1359, 1366 (Alas. 1973) (summary dismissal of college pro-
fessor); Madigan v. Police Bd. of City of Chicago, 8 Ill. App. 3d 366, 290 N.E.2d 661
(1972) (suspension of police officer); and other state supported activities and functions,
see, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (state parole revocation); Willner
v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 105 (1963) (excluding applicant
from practicing law); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492, 496-97 (1959) (denial of
security clearance which denies engineer the ability to follow his chosen profession);
Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926) (certified public ac-
countant's application to practice before Board of Tax Appeals); Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) (student expulsion); Villani v. New
York Stock Exchange, 348 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (disciplining a member
of the stock exchange).
It is presently in dispute whether public utilities fall with the state action rubric.
Compare Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972) (utility
companies are licensed to and act as an agent of the state); Bronson v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (acts of gas company are state action);
and Stanford v. Gas Service Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972) (gas company within
state action), with Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973) (while public utility commissioners acting in their
official capacity in promulgating five day notice rule act tinder color.of state law, action
of electric company in giving notice of termination of service does not constitute
state action); and Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (gas
company not within state action).
17. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
18. United States v. Tuteur, 215 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir. 1954). See Interstate Life
& Accident Co. v. Wilson, 52 Ga. App. 171, 178, 183 S.E. 672, 677 (1935); Bowman-
Boyer Co. v. Burgett, 195 Iowa 674, 678, 192 N.W. 795, 797 (1923).
19. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
20. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-68 (1970) (notice of termination
of Aid for Dependent Children benefits must detail reasons for the proposed termina-
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trative feasibility, however, have always tempered the ideal of uni-
versal actual notice. Where actual notice is not possible or practical,
the fiction of constructive notice imputes notice to the recipient as
a matter of law. But a legal fiction such as constructive notice,2 1 in-
asmuch as it departs from the norm of actual notice, can only be
justified if actual notice is impossible or so burdensome as to be
impractical.
22
The right to actual notice cannot be abridged simply because
less than actual notice is more easily or less expensively rendered
in a given situation. The necessity for actual notice must be de-
termined on the basis of a due process balancing test. Thus, in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,2 3 where notice by
publication was found inadequate for trust beneficiaries whose mail-
ing addresses were known, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a
"construction of the Due Process Clause which would . . . [make le-
gal notice impossible or impractical] . . . could not be justified. '24
NeVertheless, against the state's interest in ease of notification, said
the Court, "we must balance the individual interest sought to be
protected by the Fourteenth Aniendment."25 Constructive notice,
tion to inform the recipient of the precise questions raised about his continued
eligibility); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 104-05 (1963)
(in rejecting an applicant to the state Bar, the committee must give notice of the
grounds for his rejection for failure to meet "good character" criterion); Goldsmith v.
Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926) (denial of CPA's application to practice
before the Board of Tax Appeals without notice of reasons for denial and a hearing
violates due process); Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853, 862
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970) (in termination of tenancy in public housing,
notice must adequately inform tenant of nature of evidence against him-summary
notice of undesirable conduct is insufficient); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961) (to expel student from state college or university
for misconduct, due process requires notice containing specific charges and grounds
for expulsion).
21. Constructive notice is neither notice nor knowledge, but a legal fiction by
which the parties are treated as though they had actual notice or knowledge. See
Brown v. Otesa, 80 N.W.2d 92, 98 (N.D. 1956); Thompson v. Dairyland Mutual Ins.
Co., 30 Wis. 2d 187, 192, 140 N.W.2d 200, 202-03 (1966); Schoedel v. State Bank, 245
Wis. 74, 13 N.W.2d 534 (1944). Courts have allowed constructive notice where actual
notice is "not reasonably possible or practicable." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).
22. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 432-34 (1951) (notice by
publication in proceeding by New Jersey to escheat certain abandoned property is suf-
ficient because it is impossible to locate the owner for service of actual notice); Ballard
v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 254 (1907) (state may require personal service for enforcement
of liens for taxes and assessments on real estate for resident owners and allow service
by publication for nonresident owners because personal service is not within the state's
power where nonresidents are not within the state's borders); Cunnius v. Reading
School Dist., 198 U.S. 458, 477 (1905) (Pennsylvania statute providing for administration
of property of persons absent and unheard of for seven or more years without giving
them actual notice does not violate due process because actual notice is not possible).
23. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
24. Id. at 313-14.
25. Id. at 314. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), where an additional fi-
nancial burden on the government was an insufficient reason for failing to provide
due process hearing before terminating welfare benefits. "The interest of the eligible
389
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therefore, has consistently been found wanting where actual notice
was feasible.
26
Moreover, whether notice is adequate to satisfy the due process
clause may also depend upon the particular circumstances of the
person receiving it.27 Thus, notice which is physically served upon
the person of legal incompetents is not "reasonably calculated to
apprise the parties" and is as such constitutionally deficient.2 8
III. Due Process Notice for the Non-English Reader
A court applying the above analysis to the non-English reader
would have to determine if notice in English is "reasonably calculated
to give . . . actual notice."2 9 If it is not, and if a feasible alternative
exists which will provide more adequate notice, notification in Eng-
lish to the non-English reader would seem to violate the due process
mandate. These standards were applied recently and bilingual no-
recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, coupled with the State's in-
terest that his payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State's
competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens."
Id. at 266.
26. But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not
due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually in-
forming the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.
339 U.S. at 315. See, e.g., Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 102 (1966); Schroeder
v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211-13 (1962) (publication and posting notices in
the vicinity of owner's property is inadequate notice before diverting a river 25
miles upstream from owner's summer home when her name was ascertainable from
deed records and actual notice was possible); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S.
112, 116 (1956) (where the name of the property owner is known to the city, notifica-
tion of condemnation proceedings by publication is inadequate because it is possible
to notify by mail); City of New York v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R., 344 U.S. 293, 296-97
(1953) (notice by publication to New York City, a creditor under the Bankruptcy Act,
violates due process because constructive notice can be justified only when necessary
and actual notice was possible in this case); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928);
McDonald v. Mabee. 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917); Priest v. Trustees of Town of Las Vegas,
232 U.S. 604 (1914); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900); Burck v. Taylor, 152 U.S. 634,
654 (1894); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877) (service by publication is valid
in in rem actions where the state has seized the property since such seizure combined
with the constructive notice will probably apprise the defendant of the action; but
constructive notice on a nonresident in an in personam action involving the personal
rights of the defendant is ineffectual for any purpose).
27. "[A] generally valid notice procedure may fail to satisfy due process because
of the circumstances of the defendant." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971).
28. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146 (1956). The Court held that the
state must appoint a guardian ad litem to receive legal notice before due process
standards would be satisfied. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970) ("the
opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capabilities and circumstances of
those who are to be heard"). In applying this hearing standard to non-English speakers,
courts have recognized an obligation to provide interpreters in criminal cases. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970). To be
sure, the rights of the accused in a criminal proceeding are ordinarily greater than
those of a party to an administrative proceeding, but the cost to the state of providing
courtroom interpreters is also substantially greater than would be necessary in pro-
viding bilingual notice as set forth in this Note.
29. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
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tice rejected by the California Supreme Court in Guerrero v. Carle-
son.30 A group of Spanish speaking citizens petitioned the California
Superior Court to enjoin the California state welfare department
from reducing or terminating benefits to recipients who read only
Spanish until the welfare department provided written notice of
such proposed terminations and reductions in Spanish. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the in-
junction, holding that due process does not require notice to be
provided in Spanish in this case. Its holding was based, inter alia,
upon a conclusion that the government may reasonably assume that
the recipient will have the notice promptly translated; notice in Eng-
lish to the non-English speaker, said the court, can therefore be said
to conform to the due process requirement that it be "reasonably
calculated to inform the recipient."
31
It is clear that a non-English reader will not be informed by a
notice in English unless he is alerted to the need for translation
of the notice and has it translated promptly. For a number of reasons
a recipient who is illiterate in English may not in fact have his
notice translated immediately. For example, a Spanish speaking re-
cipient who has had all of his previous contact with the welfare de-
partment in Spanish will not expect notice in English and thus may
not be alerted to the need for translation. In view of the volume of
"junk mail," much of it on stationery deliberately made to look
"official," which most persons receive continuously, the Spanish speak-
ing recipient may understandably overlook a notice in English from,
for instance, the welfare department. Such a recipient would have
to obtain a translation of substantially all of his mail to avoid this
possibility.
Moreover, the recipients may well be understandably reluctant to
engage the help of others in such private matters. Indeed, the wel-
30. 9 Cal. 3d 808, 512 P.2d 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973).
31. We conclude that it is not unreasonable for the state to expect that persons
such as those in plaintiffs' position will promptly arrange to have someone trans-
late the contents of the notice here challenged. Accordingly, prior governmental
preparation of that notice in Spanish is not a constitutional imperative under the
due process clause.
Id. at 814, 512 P.2d at 837, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
This rationale represents a marked departure from the test used by the lower court:
"We deem it not unreasonable to require that a person receiving welfare payments
assume the burden of informing himself concerning the content and meaning of an
official notice." 103 Cal. Rptr. 552, 555 (Super. Ct. 1972) (emphasis added). The dif-
ference in the two rationales-assuming that non-English speaking persons will obtain
translations as opposed to placing a burden of translation upon them-is an important
shift in the constitutional standard. The discussion in the text emphasizes the factual
questions involved in the translation of English notices since the standard enunciated
by the California Supreme Court depends upon such facts.
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fare department itself deems such matters confidential.3 2 Thus the
recipient may object to waiving his right to confidentiality by dis-
closing all of his communications from the department to a friend
or relative who will serve as "translator." The right to confiden-
tiality of communication thus raises serious questions about the pro-
priety of expecting the recipient to have the notices translated by
friends or relatives.
More basically, however, Spanish speaking welfare recipients do
not in fact have the notices which are sent to them in English trans-
lated promptly.33 Studies conducted by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare regarding welfare department practices as they
affect Spanish speaking applicants and recipients in Sonoma County,
California, and in Connecticut suggest that many do not obtain trans-
lation of English communications that are sent to them. 34 Given
32. Spanish-speaking clients are . .. told to come back with a child or neighbor
u ho can translate, thereby deterring them from returning because of an under-
standable reluctance or refusal to have to disclose to children, neighbors and ac-
quaintances private information which the Welfare Department, by its own cri-
teria, rightfully regards as highly personal and confidential. . . . [T]he use by
non-Spanish speaking social service workers of children or neighbors as translators
creates a barrier to communication with the Spanish-speaking client who, like the
English-speaking client, seeks and is entitled to privacy.
Sonoma County HEW study, supra note 1, at 4-6. See Connecticut HEW study, supra
note I, at 6.
33. In Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 513 P.2d 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973),
Justice Tobriner in dissent correctly observed that an assumption by the court that
recipients may have their notices translated "is a far cry from finding that the notices
are 'reasonably certain to inform' a Spanish-speaking recipient . . . of the reasons for
the reduction or termination of his benefits and of his right to a hearing." Id. at 821,
512 P.2d at 842, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 210 (Tobriner, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original),
quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Batik & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
34. While no available statistics bear directly on the question of how many non-
English speaking recipients have notices in English translated, the HEW studies showed
serious discrepancies in the treatment of welfare recipients unable to read English
when compared with those who can. These discrepancies existed in all areas of appli-
cation for and provision of benefits and services. The surveys conclude that eligible
Spanish speakers were excluded, because of language problems, from assistance and
denied services for which they were eligible as a matter of law. See Connecticut HEW
study, supra note 1, at 7-8; Connecticut Welfare Bulletin, supra note 1, at 1; Sonoma
County HEW study, supra note I, at 2-4. Another significant finding is that a large
percentage of all client problems for non-English speaking clients which gave rise to
welfare fair hearings were due either to oral or written communication problems.
Connecticut HEW study 7-8. Since Spanish speaking caseworkers or translators are often
provided for Spanish speaking welfare recipients, it is reasonable to infer front these
findings that the written notices in English which were sent to Spanish speaking clients
were not translated promptly in many cases and that this resulted in denial of benefits,
giving rise to the hearing. See text accompanying note 32 supra for suggested reasons
for failure of translation.
Corroborating evidence for the conclusion that many Spanish speaking recipients
did not have notices translated comes from the figures showing that very few (less than
10 percent) of the Spanish speaking recipients brought a friend or relative to act as
interpreter at their fair hearings despite the fact that the welfare department did not
provide an interpreter in these cases. Sonoma County HEW study 2-4. In a fair hearing
the client has specifically applied for some action or benefit. It would seem that such
a client, having shown a desire to gain the benefit and fully aware of what is at stake
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this reality, whatever its reasons, such notice cannot be said to meet
the due process standard that the notice be "reasonably calculated
to apprise the recipient" of its contents. The Guerrero court's de-
cision was thus based in part upon an erroneous factual assumption.
The Guerrero court, however, rested its decision as well upon a
second rationale-that bilingual notice is not administratively feasible.
The court reasoned that if bilingual notice were required prior to
the termination or reduction of welfare benefits to Spanish speaking
persons, it would also be required prior to actions of other state
agencies with respect to the same persons and, furthermore, would
have to be extended to members of any other language group some
members of which were illiterate in English.35 Such a burden, so
staggering, said the court, that it would virtually bring the govern-
ment to a halt,30 was beyond the mandate of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
To be sure, feasibility has always been a limitation upon the ap-
plication of due process notice requirements. 37 Feasibility, however,
is not a talisman; it is rather an aspect of the traditional due process
balancing test. In this respect the Guerrero court overestimated the
administrative difficulties associated with providing bilingual notice
to Spanish speaking persons. Moreover, its assumption that bilingual
notice must in all cases be extended as well to other language groups
demonstrates a misunderstanding of the rationale for extending it,
in some cases, to Spanish speaking persons. The feasibility of pro-
viding bilingual notice to ethnic language groups not as large or geo-
graphically concentrated as Spanish speaking persons is a question
which goes to the remedy to be afforded to the other groups rather
than the constitutional necessity of bilingual notice to Spanish speak-
ing (and other similarly situated) persons.
in the fair hearing, would be more likely to bring a friend to interpret than he or
she would be to have a friend translate all official looking communications which
are in English.
35. 9 Cal. 3d at 815, 512 P.2d at 837-38, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 205-06. See Carmona v.
Sheffield, 325 F. Supp. 1341, 1342 (N.D. Cal. 1971), where the plaintiffs requested
notice in Spanish of denial of unemployment benefits for recipients residing in Santa
Clara County, California, who read and write only Spanish. The district court dis-
missed the petition, holding that the provision of such notice would be impossible.
"The conduct of official business, including the proceedings and enactments of Con-
gress, the Courts and administrative agencies, would become all but impossible." The
Ninth Circuit affirmed. 475 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1973). The trial court refused to
consider the possibility of distinguishing Spanish speaking recipients from other lan-
guage groups in Santa Clara for purposes of legal notices. Plaintiffs in the case had
offered briefs supporting the distinction of Spanish from other languages in the area;
these arguments should have been considered by the court at trial.
36. 9 Cal. 3d at 816, 512 P.2d at 838, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
37. See p. 389 supra.
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A. Full Bilingual Notice
Whether full bilingual notice to the members of an ethnic lan-
guage group is necessary depends upon the outcome of a weighing
of the costs to the state of providing such notice against the benefits
bestowed by that notice upon individual members of the group.
3 s
For members of a linguistic group which comprises a substantial mi-
nority of the population of a given metropolitan area and has a rela-
tively high rate of English illiteracy, those benefits would be sub-
stantial.
Nationwide statistics show that the problem of English illiteracy
is substantially more serious for those who speak Spanish than for
any other linguistic group. 39 These statistics suggest that Spanish
speaking persons have greater need for bilingual notice than any
other group nationwide. 40 Moreover, Spanish speaking people tend
to live in ethnic concentrations in certain parts of the country. "1
Spanish speaking communities are often largely homogeneous, with
newspapers and communication facilities in their own language,
42
insulated from the English speaking population and largely self-
contained.
43
It is thus not surprising that the rights of Spanish speaking per-
38. See p. 389 supra.
39. Of the 7,902,000 people over 10 years old in the United States who are unable
to read English, 4,754,000 reported their ethnic origin to the Census. Over 28 percent
(1,336,000) of those illiterate in English were of Spanish origin. The only other lin-
guistic group with more than 250,000 English illiterates is the Italian group (479,000).
CURRENT POPULATION REPORT, supra note 7, at 18.
40. While over 95 percent of each ethnic group except Italian (92.3 percent) can
read English, only 80.2 percent of those of Spanish origin are able to read English. Id.
41. Of the 2,293,141 Spanish households in the United States, 81 percent (1,866,955)
are located in the nine states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Texas. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1970, SUBJECT REPORTS, FINAL REPORT PC(2)-IC, PERSONS OF
SPANISH ORIGIN 136-49 (1973) [hereinafter cited as PERSONS OF SPANISH ORIGINi. Of the
9,072,602 persons of Spanish origin in the United States, 61 percent (5,561,922) live in
the three states of California, Texas, and New York. Another 17 percent (2,388,774)
live in the ten states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Florida, Colo-
rado, New Mexico, Arizona, and New Jersey. Id. at 1.
42. See Castro v. California, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 238, 466 P.2d 244, 254-55, 85 Cal. Rptr.
20, 30-31 (1970).
43. See J. BURMA, SPANISH-SPEAKING GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES 7-8, 88-90 (1954);
N. GLAZER & D. MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT 100, 300 (1963); 0. LEWIS, A
STUDY OF SLUM CULTURE 110-11, 139 (1968). Additional support for the proposition that
persons of Spanish origin in the United States are isolated from .the English speaking
community and self-contained is found in the statistics showing the extent to which
Spanish speakers, in comparison with other linguistic groups, have continued using
Spanish as their language of communication. Of the 11,687,000 Americans who speak
a language other than English in their homes, 4,600,000 speak Spanish. The only other
group of which more than 500,000 do not speak English at home is the Italian group
(658,000). CURRENT POPULATION REPORT, supra note 7, at 12. In Connecticut "a sub-
stantial percentage of all Spanish-surnamed persons throughout the state speak Spanish,
not English, as their language of regular communication." Connecticut HEW study,
supra note 1, at 3.
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sons have been particularly affected by the absence of bilingual no-
tice.44 Indeed, in recognition of the special problems which Spanish
speaking persons face, many states, particularly those with substan-
tial Spanish speaking populations, have begun to recognize an ob-
ligation in connection with the operations of administrative agen-
cies to provide bilingual services in Spanish.
45
Of course, language groups other than Spanish, while a relatively
small proportion of the population nationally, may nevertheless in
some locales satisfy the criteria-comprising a substantial minority of
the local population and suffering from a relatively high rate of
English illiteracy-which suggest that substantial benefits may flow
to them as a consequence of the provision of bilingual notice. Thus,
the insular Chinese communities in San Francisco and New York
may equally claim that bilingual notice would engender for them
benefits of substantial magnitude.
46
Against these important benefits must be weighed the costs of
rendering bilingual service. While the Guerrero court viewed these
costs with great apprehension, 47 such concern seems unfounded, at
least with respect to language groups meeting the criteria set out
above.
Before the notifier may reasonably be required to provide bilingual
notice, of course, he must know that the recipient does not read
English and what other language, if any, the recipient does read. For
most state agencies, plaintiffs in consumer credit actions, and utili-
ties, this should not be a significant burden. Where individuals have
dealings with state agencies, e.g., the welfare department, motor
vehicle department, social security department, and with state-regu-
lated utility companies, initial contact is usually in the form of an
application or interview. It would be no undue burden to require
the agency or utility company to ask what language the applicant
is able to read and to record this information on the initial intake
form. Even if the initial contact is by telephone, e.g., a request for
service to a utility company, it would not be burdensome to re-
quire the utility to ask and record on file what language the person
requesting service can read. In the case of consumer credit contracts,
there must be some written or oral communication and negotiation.
44. See pp. 386-87 supra.
45. See pp. 396-97 & notes 48-55 infra.
46, Of the 435,062 Chinese in the United States, 88,402 live in the San Francisco-
Oakland, California, area, and 77,099 live in New York City. The only other metro-
politan areas with greater than 12,500 Chinese are Honolulu (48,897) and Los Angeles-
Long Beach (41,500). PERSONS OF SPANISH ORIGIN, supra note 41, at X, 109.
47. See p. 393 supra.
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It would not be a large burden to require the credit company to
ask what language the applicant can read.
Since the language abilities of potential notice recipients are, at
least in the above instances, easily ascertained, the inquiry shifts to
a consideration of the actual burden which bilingual notice would
impose. In fact, there is widespread and growing provision of notice
and services in Spanish as well as English. 48 Thus, in some juris-
dictions state agencies,4 9 utility companies,50 and plaintiffs in con-
sumer credit actions5' send bilingual notice. Similarly, government
pamphlets,52 examinations,5 3 and forms54 are beginning to appear
in Spanish.55 While such practices may not be dispositive of the
48. See Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 810, 513 P.2d 833, 834, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201,
202 (1973) (stipulation by parties).
49. In Connecticut and New Jersey, welfare applications, notices, booklets, and most
affidavits are prepared in both Spanish and English. See Comment, New Jersey Trans-
lates Welfare Forms Into Spanish, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 33 (1972); Agreement stipu-
lated in suit seeking to require welfare department to provide bilingual caseworkers
and notices, Sanchez v. Norton, Civil No. 15732, before Judge Robert C. Zampano, U.S.
District Court, District of Connecticut, June 19, 1973.
50. In New Haven, Connecticut, for example, all bills, requests for meter readings,
and termination notices are sent in Spanish and English by the Southern Connecticut
Gas Company (copies on file with the Yale Law Journal).
51. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First and Second
Judicial Departments, has decided, effective September 1, 1973, to require that all sum-
monses in consumer credit actions be bilingual (Spanish and English). OFFICIAL CONt-
PILATION OF CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE STATE OF Nrw YORK tit. 22, §§ 2900.2
(e),(f), (h), (i) (as amended 1973).
52. See CAL. UNEMPL. INS. CODE § 316 (1972) (informational pamphlets in Spanish
and English).
Other state agencies have made similar accommodations to their non-English speaking
populations. In New Haven, Connecticut, for example, the Manpower Area Planning
Council has compiled a bilingual directory of federally financed job training programs
in Spanish and English. See New Haven Register, Nov. 2, 1972, at 76, col. 4.
The Social Security Administration prints most informational pamphlets in Spanish
in New York. All social security forms and notices are printed in Spanish for use in
Puerto Rico, but these forms are not used in New York. Conversation with Carmen
Quiniones, Staff Assistant, BHA Regional Office, Social Security Administration, New
York, August 8, 1973. Duplicate sets of all social security documents are available in
Spanish in New York. Conversation with Jerome Levy, Deputy Regional Attorney, New
York office of HEW, August 3, 1973.
53. Motor vehicle driving examinations are given in Spanish and English in Con-
necticut. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 14-36 (Supp. 1969).
54. Thus, the Connecticut Welfare Department has instituted a program of ascer-
taining an individual's ability to communicate in English at the time of his initial
interview and utilizing bilingual forms (Spanish and English) for Spanish speaking
clients who are unable to read English. See Connecticut Welfare Bulletin, supra note
1, at 1-3.
55. Indeed, some states go considerably further. Connecticut, for example, provides
bilingual services at welfare fair hearings, Conversation with Carolyn Packard, Chief of
Policy Development and Staff Services, Department of Welfare, November 13, 1973;
motor vehicle hearings, Conversation with Mr. Carl Strauss, Ass't Dir. of Driver Li-
censing, Connecticut Dep't of Motor Vehicles, November 13, 1973; and unemployment
compensation hearings, Conversation with Mr. Richard Ficks, Director of Public In-
formation, Connecticut State Dep't of Labor, November 13, 1973.
In New York, all communications from the Department of Social Services to clients
are sent in Spanish and English. Conversation with Bob Carroll, Deputy Administrator,
Human Resources Administration, New York City, August 6, 1973. Interpreters are
provided at hearings for Spanish speakers in New York by the Department of Social
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issue of feasibility of bilingual notice, they seemingly demonstrate
at least presumptive feasibility5 6
With respect to a private, noninstitutional litigant suing a non-
English speaking person, however, the outcome of a due process
balance may well be different. It is certainly less likely that the
private litigant will be aware of the language capabilities of the
person he is suing or that, in any event, he will have the facility to
translate notices. Given these considerations, the burden on the pri-
vate litigant may be sufficiently great that he may be distinguished
from state agencies, utilities, and companies extending consumer
credit.5
7
Thus, the Guerrero court's concern that bilingual notice in Spanish,
is required for a variety of proceedings other than merely those be-
fore welfare agencies, would prove an intolerable burden seems un-
founded. That court was also concerned, however, that a decision
in favor of the Spanish speaking litigants would apply "to any other
language-Chinese or Japanese, Russian or Greek, Filipino or Samoan
-in which a non-English speaking recipient . . . was known to be
literate, regardless of how small that language group might be."58
Admittedly, if the force of the argument carried over as well to
any language group of any size in which persons illiterate in English
could read notices in their native tongue, the burden on the state
might well be beyond reasonable limits. 59 The argument, however,
Services. Conversation with Florence Aitchison, Program Officer, New York City De-
partment of Social Services, August 6, 1973. Chinese, Greek, Russian, German, Spanish,
and Italian interpreters are also available at New York social security hearings. Con-
versation with Shep Shapiro, Assistant Regional Representative, Bureau of Hearings
and Appeals, Social Security Administration, August 7, 1973. Similarly, interpreters are
provided for Spanish speakers in every civil court in New York City and Spanish in-
terpreters are used during interviews with clients in small claims courts in Harlem.
Conversation with Judge Edward Thompson, Administrative Judge, Civil Court of
New York County, August 7, 1973. Interpreters were supplied by the Board of Elec-
tions for New York County for Spanish speakers at the polls in areas with large
Spanish speaking populations. Conversation with James Siket, Administrative Manager
of the Board of Elections, August 2, 1973.
The provision of such bilingual servicps may soon become the subject of congres-
sional action. Senator John V. Tunney of California is drafting a bilingual courts act
that would mandate translation personnel and equipment in every Federal court district
with 50,000 or more residents whose primary fluency is in some language other than
English. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1973, at 26, col. 1.
56. Moreover, the difficulty involved in translating notices into another language
is probably exaggerated by those who do not wish to do the translating. Cf. Castro
v. California, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 241 n.32, 466 P.2d 244, 257 n.32, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 33 n.32
(1970) (the burden involved in the translation and distribution of electoral materials
in Spanish is probably less btrdensome than the administrative difficulties anticipated
by the state).
57. Perhaps the courts could make some accommodation in such cases by requiring
tag line notice in five or six major languages. See p. 399 infra.
58. 9 Cal. 3d at 815, 512 P.2d at 837-38, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 205-06.
59. The resolution of this matter in Guerrero was further complicated by plain-
tiffs' needless stipulation that such broad relief wotld be appropriate. Id. at 815, 512
P.2d at 837, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
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requires no such extension of relief. The due process rationale of-
fered above is that members of a linguistic group comprising a sub-
stantial minority of the population of a given locale and suffering
from a high rate of English illiteracy would significantly benefit
from a requirement of bilingual notice, while the costs of such no-
tice to the state, utilities, and certain institutional private litigants
would not be unreasonable. For each language group in a given area,
the balance of interests between the group and the parties required
to render notice will be different; each case must be judged upon
its own merits. Under this view providing bilingual notice to Spanish
speaking recipients does not necessarily require similar treatment for
any other particular language group.
What it does require is that a court, when called upon to decide
the question of notice for a different language group, make factual
inquiries with respect to the group's rate of English illiteracy, the
extent to which it is isolated from the surrounding English speaking
population, and its proportion of the locale's population. Many Ian-
guage groups may well comprise an important fraction of a locale's
population but be well integrated into the English speaking culture
and have an English illiteracy rate significantly lower than the Span-
ish group.60 Recognizing a distinction between such a language group
and the Spanish speaking group would be a rational exercise of
judicial authority.
B. Tag Line Notice
Full bilingual notice is preferable to any shortened or tag line no-
tice, of course, because only full bilingual notice can apprise the
non-English reader of all of the contents required for due process
notice. That full bilingual notice is constitutionally mandated for
some language groups but not for others does not, however, end
the discussion with respect to the due process notice rights of the
other groups. The outcome of a due process balance, while less
strongly in favor of bilingual notice to them than to more numerous
and concentrated groups, may nevertheless require an alteration of
notice procedures. In fact, providing some sort of notice which ac-
commodates, at least in part, their lesser interests is not a totally in-
tractable problem.
Where full bilingual notice is not feasible, a less burdensome form
of notice which serves some of the same purposes as bilingual notice
60. See note 43 supra.
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is tag line notice. A tag line, written in five or six major languages,01
would be affixed to the otherwise all English notice: "This is a le-
gal notice. Have it translated. Re: welfare termination, utility termi-
nation, civil suit .... " It would be a relatively easy matter for the
state to translate the tag line's few words into the five or six lan-
guages and make sheets of tag lines available to administrative agen-
cies, utilities, and other parties which may become litigants with
non-English speaking persons. The increased cost of providing tag
line notice would be minimal and, when affixed to the English no-
tice, would provide some degree of actual notice to almost everyone.
2
The tag line, of course, does not provide full notice to the re-
cipient in his own language. It provides only notice of notice. But
it is clearly preferable to a notice merely in English that may leave
the recipient totally unaware that he has received a legal notice
which may announce matters of serious consequences for him. While
the recipient must depend upon someone, friends or a local agency,
to translate the notice in order to be fully apprised of its contents,
tag line notice at least informs him of the necessity of translation.
Conclusion
Due process notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise the
recipient of the proposed action against him. In fact, many non-
English reading persons fail to have legal notices which are sent to
them in English translated and may suffer accordingly. For several
reasons, this failure to have notices in English translated is not sur-
prising. Such notice accordingly cannot be said to be reasonably cal-
culated to apprise the recipient of the impending action. Whether
such notice nevertheless satisfies due process depends upon the out-
come of a weighing of the costs to the state of providing a more
meaningful notice against the benefits bestowed upon the individual
by that more meaningful notice.
Full bilingual notice to members of language ethnic groups which
comprise a substantial part of the population of a locality and which
61. The six non-English linguistic groups with the largest English illiteracy popula-
tions are Spanish, Italian, German, Polish, Irish, and Russian. CURRENT POPULATION RE-
PORT, supra note 7, at 18.
62. There are 2,150,000 people in the United States unable to read English whose
ethnic origins are other than German, Italian, Polish, Irish, Spanish, or Russian. Id.
This is probably an overestimate of the number of persons who would be unable to
read a tag line in one of those six languages because many people who speak other
languages are able to read at least one of the six major languages.
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are characterized by a high English illiteracy rate is required by
the due process clause because members of those groups would en-
joy significant advantages while the cost to the state is not such as
to render bilingual notice unfeasible. Providing such notice to all
language groups in all locales might indeed impose an intolerable
burden upon the state, but due process does not require a broad-
ening of such bilingual relief to all language groups. For the larger
and more locally concentrated of these lesser language groups, how-
ever, due process may require a form of notice-tag line notice-
which, while not fully bilingual, nevertheless at least calls attention
to the necessity of obtaining a translation. The combination of bi-
lingual and tag line notice would thus significantly improve the
quality of notice to all but a small fraction of non-English reading
persons.
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